| dc.description.abstract | This thesis critically examines the relationship between judicial activism and judicial restraint in
the constitutional jurisprudence of Bangladesh. It focuses on the inherent tension arising from the
Supreme Court’s dual responsibility to act as the guardian of the transformative ideals of the 1972
Constitution while simultaneously exercising restraint in respect of the democratic legitimacy of
the elected executive and legislature. The study is situated within the broader scholarly debate on
the proper limits of judicial power in a democratic polity. It argues that the oscillation between
activism and restraint in Bangladesh is not merely a theoretical concern, but a practical
constitutional reality with significant implications for constitutional stability, protection of
fundamental rights, and the balance of power among state institutions. To address this issue, the
research adopts a multi-methodological approach combining doctrinal analysis of landmark and
contemporary judicial decisions, historical examination of constitutional amendments, and
application of theoretical models drawn from comparative judicial politics, including legal,
attitudinal, and strategic perspectives.
The central argument advanced is that the Bangladesh Supreme Court does not consistently adhere
to either judicial activism or judicial restraint as a fixed or absolute philosophy. Instead, it engages
in a form of contextual judicial statecraft. In situations marked by governance failures, legislative
inaction, or serious violations of fundamental rights, the Court has employed activist tools such as
expansive interpretation of constitutional rights, public interest litigation (PIL), exercise of suo
motu jurisdiction, and reliance on the basic structure doctrine. Conversely, in matters perceived to
fall within the primary competence of the political branches or during periods of political
sensitivity, the Court has exercised restraint through doctrines of deference, political question, and
strict constitutional interpretation in order to preserve institutional legitimacy.
While this strategic approach has strengthened constitutional supremacy and expanded rights
protection, it has also resulted in inconsistency, legal uncertainty, and perceptions of contingent
judicial independence. The thesis concludes that an ad-hoc balancing between activism and
restraint is unsustainable for long-term constitutional governance and calls for a more principled
and institutionalized framework to guide judicial conduct. | en_US |
